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Research has shown that people can respond both self-defensively and pro-socially when they 
experience shame. We address this paradox by differentiating among specific appraisals (of specific 
self-defect and concern for condemnation) and feelings (of shame, inferiority, and rejection) often 
reported as part of shame. In two Experiments (Study 1: N = 85; Study 2: N = 112), manipulations 
that put participants’ social-image at risk increased their appraisal of concern for condemnation. In 
Study 2, a manipulation of moral failure increased participants’ appraisal that they suffered a 
specific self-defect. In both studies, mediation analyses showed that effects of the social-image at 
risk manipulation on self-defensive motivation were explained by appraisal of concern for 
condemnation and felt rejection. In contrast, the effect of the moral failure manipulation on pro-
social motivation in Study 2 was explained by appraisal of a specific self-defect and felt shame. 
Thus, distinguishing among the appraisals and feelings tied to shame enabled clearer prediction of 
pro-social and self-defensive responses to moral failure with and without risk to social-image. 
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 To err is human. Hence, we must all deal with moral failure, at least occasionally. 
People often experience feelings of shame as a result of their failures. Psychologists have 
traditionally assumed that shame motivates self-defensive reactions to failure (e.g., covering-up, 
avoidance; for a review, see Tangney & Dearing, 2002). However, a growing number of studies 
offer new insight, showing that shame can also promote pro-social reactions such as apology and 
helping (e.g., Gausel, Leach, Vignoles & Brown, 2012; Shepherd, Spears & Manstead, 2013; 
Tangney, Stuewig & Martinez, 2014). Thus, at present the literature on shame appears to be 
paradoxical, as shame seemingly predicts both self-defensive and pro-social motivations regarding 
failure.  
In this paper, we delve into shame to examine the specific appraisals and feelings about 
moral failure that can more precisely explain what leads people to respond pro-socially and what 
leads them to respond self-defensively. Based in Gausel and Leach’s (2011) conceptual model, we 
suggest that people may be more or less concerned about their self-image as well as about the 
possible risk to their social-image when they fail morally. Concern for a social-image at risk 
encourages the appraisal that one will be condemned by others, which fuels feelings of rejection and 
inferiority. This highly threatening appraisal-feeling combination should motivate self-defense, 
such as avoidance. In contrast, concern for one’s self-image encourages the appraisal that one 
suffers a specific self-defect that should be addressed. The self-castigating feeling of shame about a 
specific self-defect should promote pro-social efforts to improve the self and one’s social relations 
with those affected by one’s moral failure, if such improvement appears possible.  
Thus, in a first empirical step, we used Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) to validate 
measures of the appraisals (specific self-defect and concern for condemnation) and feelings (of felt 
shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority) embedded in common conceptualizations of shame. 
Second, we experimentally manipulated actual (Study 1) or imagined (Study 2) events, to show that 
the appraisal of specific self-defect is caused by moral failure alone whereas the appraisal of 
concern for condemnation is caused by moral failure with risk to social-image. Third, we used 
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mediation analysis to show that moral failure leads to pro-social motivation via an 
appraisal of specific self-defect  felt shame pathway. In contrast, moral failure with risk to social-
image leads to self-defensive motivation via an appraisal of concern for condemnation  felt 
rejection pathway. Thus, we show when and why people respond to moral failure pro-socially 
rather than self-defensively. In this way, we aim to resolve the paradox of shame. 
Shame: Self-Defensive or Pro-Social? 
It has long been thought that individuals tend to cope with their shame for moral and other 
failure self-defensively, through avoidance, hiding, and running away (for reviews, see Ferguson, 
Brugman, White & Eyre, 2007; Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). More recently, however, studies of both 
individual (e.g., de Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2010; Lickel, Kushlev, Savalei, Matta & 
Schmader, 2014; Tangney et al., 2014) and group-based emotions (e.g., Allpress, Barlow, Brown & 
Louis, 2010; Berndsen & McGarty, 2012; Berndsen & Gausel, 2015; Gausel & Brown, 2012; 
Imhoff, Bilewicz & Erb, 2012; Shepherd et al., 2013) have found that shame is associated with 
several pro-social responses. For instance, Schmader and Lickel (2006) asked participants to recall 
a time when they felt either “shame” or “guilt” about something they had caused. Participants 
reported wanting to repair the damage done slightly more in instances of shame. In a study of 
group-based emotion, Gausel and colleagues (2012) found that the more shame Norwegians 
expressed about their in-group’s persecution of an ethnic minority, the greater their motivation to 
communicate contrition and offer restitution. And, in a recent longitudinal study of almost 500 
inmates, Tangney and colleagues (2014) found that when inmates felt shame for their earlier crime 
then “shame had a direct negative effect on recidivism” (p. 5).  
The growing body of diverse evidence that shame is linked to both pro-social and self-
defensive motivation calls for a rethinking of the established view of shame. Hence, rather than 
focusing on the broad concept of shame examined in most previous research, we conceptualize, 
measure, and examine the distinct appraisals (specific self-defect and concern for condemnation) 
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and feelings (of felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority) about moral failure that are 
typically embedded in the shame concept. By conceptualizing, measuring, and examining the 
specific appraisals and feelings embedded in the shame concept, we should be able to make better 
sense of its paradoxical effects. Thus, we can use specific appraisal-feeling combinations to more 
precisely explain what leads people to respond pro-socially to moral failure and what leads them to 
respond self-defensively (Gausel et al., 2012). 
Appraisal-Feeling Combinations: A Model of the Experience of Moral Failure 
 Appraisal theory argues that emotions are determined in large part by the appraisals that 
people make of events in their lives (Lazarus, 1991; for a review, see Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 
2001). At the most general level, dysphoric emotions like shame rely on appraising an event as an 
unwanted failure in a domain of some relevance to the self. Beyond this, more specific appraisals of 
what the failure suggests about the self and its relation to the environment determine the specific 
way that people feel about the failure and what they are motivated to do about it (Lazarus, 1991). 
This is why understanding individuals’ appraisals of an event is necessary to understand what they 
mean when they express their feelings with words such as “ashamed” (see Gausel, 2014a; Leach, 
2010).  
Based in appraisal theory, Gausel and Leach (2011) argued that specific appraisal  feeling 
combinations regarding moral failure help explain why people respond self-defensively or pro-
socially. More specifically, they argued that whether people respond pro-socially or self-defensively 
to moral failure is largely determined by whether their appraisal is most focused on improving their 
self-image or salvaging their social-image from possible damage.  
Responding Pro-Socially: Shame and Improving Self-Image. There is a broad consensus 
that a moral failure can be appraised as an indication that the self suffers from a defect or 
shortcoming (for reviews, see Ferguson, 2005; Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Tangney & Fischer, 
1995). Although early clinical theorizing assumed that failure is typically attributed to internal, 
global, and stable causes (H.B. Lewis, 1971; for reviews, see M. Lewis, 1992; Tangney et al., 
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2007), most non-clinical research shows that shame is only modestly tied to such 
characterological attributions for failure (e.g., Tracy & Robins, 2006; for reviews, see Ferguson, 
2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Gausel and Leach (2011) therefore argued that the appraisal of a 
wholly defective self should more reasonably be expected to be linked to the subjective feeling of 
inferiority, rather than the feeling of shame. Consistent with this, in two studies of self-reported 
feelings about an in-group’s moral failure, Gausel et al. (2012) found feeling of inferiority and 
shame to be distinct.  
If the feeling of shame is distinguished from the feeling of inferiority, it becomes clearer that 
felt shame should be tied to an appraisal that a moral failure indicates a specific self-defect or 
shortcoming in the self, rather than a global defect (see Ferguson et al., 2007). It is this appraisal of 
a specific self-defect that often gives rise to the feeling of shame commonly expressed through the 
near synonymous terms of “ashamed,” “disgraced,” and “humiliated” (see Schmader & Lickel, 
2006; Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson & O’Connor, 1987; Tangney, Miller, Flicker & Barlow, 1996). As 
shame is an intense state of self-criticism (e.g., H.B. Lewis, 1971; Roseman et al., 1994; Tangney & 
Dearing, 2002; Tracy & Robins, 2006), the most direct way to alleviate the self-criticism of shame 
is to improve the defect in the self that has been highlighted by one’s failure (see also Ahmed, 
Harris, Braithwaite & Braithwaite, 2001; de Hooge, Breugelmans & Zeelenberg, 2008; Ferguson et 
al., 2007). Indeed, shame is moderately to strongly associated with wanting to improve the 
individual self (de Hooge et al., 2010; Lickel et al., 2014; Niedenthal, Tangney & Gavanski, 1994) 
or to improve the in-group self (Gausel & Brown, 2012).  
Thus, people can appraise a specific moral failure as evidence of a specific self-defect in the 
self. This appraisal shows concern for self-image, and thus it should be especially linked to the 
subjective feeling of shame as an intense state of self-criticism. As self-criticism, the feeling of 
shame should predict motivation to improve one’s self-image by repairing the self-defect and the 
damage it caused, as long as such improvement is viewed as possible. This appraisal of specific 
self-defect  felt shame pathway is shown in Figure 1. It should be most clearly observed and most 
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predictive of pro-social motivation when the feeling of shame is distinguished from the 
feeling of inferiority that has often been conflated with felt shame in prior research (Gausel et al., 
2012). 
 Responding Self-Defensively to Risked Social-Image. Of course, in some instances of 
moral failure, one’s social-image is especially at risk because there is an audience of people who 
can morally condemn one (H.B. Lewis, 1971; Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, & Fischer, 2002; for 
reviews, see Gausel, 2013; Leach, Bilali & Pagliaro, 2014). This is why Gausel and Leach (2011) 
argued that a moral failure can also be appraised as raising concern about potential condemnation 
by others who may become aware of one’s moral failure (e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera, Fischer, 
Manstead, & Zaalberg, 2008). Because people often use morality as a basis for judging each other 
(Gausel, 2013; Leach et al., 2015) any failure associated with the self may do damage to one’s 
social-image. Due to this, Gausel and Leach (2011) placed weight on the powerful need to belong 
(Bowlby, 1969) as key to understanding why people respond with defensiveness after failures. As 
others’ potential disapproval is emotionally painful (for reviews on social exclusion, see Gerber & 
Wheeler, 2009; Leary, 2007), people engage in various defensive strategies to limit risks to their 
social-image (for reviews, see Gausel, 2013; H.B. Lewis, 1971; Scheff, 2000). 
Hence, Gausel and Leach (2011) developed H. B. Lewis’s (1971) repeated references to the 
experience of “rejection” in her work on the shame construct to argue that the appraisal of concern 
for condemnation is tied to a subjective feeling of rejection  (i.e., “rebuffed,” “alone”). Consistent 
with this, research shows that concern for condemnation by others is tied to an intensely unpleasant 
feeling, expressed with words like “feel rejected” and “feel rebuffed” as well as “feel isolated” and 
“feel alone” (Gausel, 2014b; M. Lewis, 1992; Retzinger & Scheff, 2000). This aspect of H. B. 
Lewis’s (1971) work has largely gone unnoticed by most research on the complexities associated 
with shame. Perhaps for this reason, previous research into shame as a basis for self-defense has not 
considered the appraisal of concern for condemnation nor the feeling of rejection that often follow 
from self-relevant failures.  Gausel and Leach (2011), however, have revived this aspect of H. B. 
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Lewis (1971) analysis of the shame experience, and through this, they offered a theoretical 
model that explained how self-defensive and pro-social motivation can originate from the same 
failure. 
As the feeling of rejection reflects the psychological experience of a social-image at risk, 
Gausel and Leach (2011) argued that felt rejection motivates effort to limit such risk through 
defense of one’s social-image. Indeed, research shows that the feeling of rejection is linked 
consistently with self-defensive, as well as anti-social, responses (for reviews, see Gerber & 
Wheeler, 2009; Leary, 2007) such as blaming others for one’s failure (Gausel, 2014b). Thus, there 
is good reason to expect that an appraisal of concern for condemnation  feeling of rejection 
pathway will explain why a moral failure that puts one’s social-image at risk leads to self-defensive 
responses such as avoidance and covering-up (see Figure 1). As such, the feeling of rejection and its 
attendant appraisal of concern for condemnation should provide a more precise explanation of self-
defensive responses to moral failure than the feeling of shame per se.  
The Present Studies 
At present, only one previous paper has examined the Gausel and Leach (2011) model of the 
experience of moral failure. Gausel et al. (2012) reported two studies examining individual 
differences in Norwegians’ appraisals and feelings about a national moral failure. Although Gausel 
et al. (2012) provided valuable first evidence in support of Gausel and Leach’s (2011) conceptual 
model, their individual differences approach focused on who experienced group moral failure in the 
particular ways specified. As far as we are aware, no research has examined the causal question of 
when a moral failure will be appraised as a self-defect and when it will be appraised as concern for 
condemnation. By cueing these two appraisals separately, we examine their idea that it is possible 
damage to social-image that leads to self-defensiveness, and that it is damage to self-image that 
leads to pro-sociality. Thus, we manipulated risk to social-image (Study 1 and 2) and moral failure 
(Study 2) in experiments on actual (Study 1) or imagined (Study 2) individual moral failures, to 
provide evidence for the theorized pathways shown in Figure 1. Based in Gausel and Leach’s 
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conceptual model, we expected a moral failure  appraisal of specific self-defect  
feeling of shame pathway to best predict pro-social responses. In contrast, we expected a situation 
of moral failure with risk to social-image  appraisal of concern for condemnation  feeling of 
rejection pathway to best predict self-defensive responses to moral failure.  
Scale Validation: Studies 1 and 2 
Before examining our central hypotheses of when responses to moral failure are pro-social 
or self-defensive, we thought it important to demonstrate that the two appraisals (of specific self-
defect and concern for condemnation) and three feelings (of felt shame, felt inferiority, and felt 
rejection) could be measured as distinct constructs. Thus, we adapted Gausel and colleagues’ (2012) 
items referring to group moral failure to the case of individual moral failure and examined them in a 
CFA.  
Method 
Participants and Procedure. The 197 participants from Study 1 and 2 that provided 
sufficient data for analyses (55 male, 141 female, one unspecified; Mage = 26.2, range: 18-65 years) 
were combined to achieve a reasonable sample size for CFA. Each study is described more fully 
below. 
Measures. Responses to the appraisal and feeling items adapted from Gausel et al. (2012) 
were given on a seven-point response scale that ranged from not at all (1) to very much (7). Given 
that Study 1 (in Norway) and Study 2 (in England) were designed in parallel, measures were 
translated and back-translated when they were initially developed, so as to yield highly comparable 
items across the two languages.  
We measured the appraisal of specific self-defect (α = .57)1 with two items: “I think I am 
defective in some way” and “I think this episode expresses a moral failure in me.” We measured an 
appraisal of concern for condemnation with three items (α = .91): “Others might not have the same 
respect for me because of this”, “I can be rejected by others because of what I have done” and “I 
think I can be isolated from others because of this”.   
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As discussed above, the emotion words “ashamed,” “disgraced,” and “humiliated” 
are very similar in meaning in English, and thus they have been included in many published 
measures of shame (e.g., Gausel & Brown; 2012; Gausel et al., 2012; Iyer et al., 2006; Lickel et al., 
2005; Tangney et al., 1996). Hence, we measured felt shame (α = .89) with three items: “I feel 
disgraced thinking about this”, “I feel ashamed thinking about what I had done”, and “I feel 
humiliated reflecting on this”. We assessed felt inferiority with two items (α = .77): “I feel inferior 
to others reflecting on what happened” and “I feel vulnerable thinking about what happened” and 
we measured felt rejection with three items (α = .89): “I feel rejected thinking about what 
happened”, “I feel alone thinking about what happened”, and “I feel rebuffed thinking about what 
happened”. 
Results 
We used Mplus Version 6 to test our hypothesized measurement model in a CFA with 
maximum likelihood estimation. Missing values were handled using full information maximum 
likelihood estimation, avoiding the need for imputation. Following the recommendations of Hu and 
Bentler (1999), we assessed model fit using the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Standardized Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR). Based on discussions in the statistical literature (Hu & Bentler, 
1999; Kline, 2005; Marsh, Hau, & Wen, 2004), we considered values of CFI > .95 and SRMR < .08 
to indicate a good fit and values of CFI > .90 and SRMR < .10 to indicate an acceptable fit to the 
data.  
Measurement model. Our hypothesized measurement model is shown in Figure 2. We 
expected the 13 items to load uniquely on their respective factors, measuring two distinct appraisals 
(specific self-defect and concern for condemnation) and three distinct feelings (of shame, rejection, 
and inferiority). Adopting a conservative approach, we did not allow items to cross-load on any of 
the latent variables, nor did we allow correlations between error terms. However, consistent with 
our theoretical model, the five latent factors were allowed to correlate.  
Preliminary analyses established that our measurement model was supported in both 
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samples, and that the assumption of metric invariance was tenable.2 Hence, we report 
analyses using the pooled data. To avoid confounding the item correlations with mean-level 
differences across the two samples, we centered the ratings of each item around their mean within 
each study sample (see Fischer & Fontaine, 2011). Figure 2 shows the standardized solution for the 
pooled sample. As is common with measurement models, the chi-square was moderate in size and 
statistically significant: χ² (55) = 167.09, p < .001. However, values of CFI = .928 and SRMR = 
.056 indicated an acceptable fit to the data. As shown in Figure 2, all items loaded strongly on their 
respective factors (standardized ’s ≥ .60; all p’s < .001), indicating that each latent variable was 
well defined by its items. Correlations among the five latent variables ranged from moderate (.49) 
to high (.80). Note that correlations among latent variables are typically higher than those among 
observed variables because they are not attenuated by unreliability. Our model predicts that these 
five factors will be closely related, but even the highest correlation in our model indicates that less 
than two thirds of variance is shared between the two underlying latent dimensions. 
Alternative models. Model comparisons showed the superiority of our measurement model 
over numerous simpler alternatives, confirming that it is necessary to distinguish all five constructs. 
First, our model fit better than a three-factor model where appraisal of specific self-defect and felt 
shame made up the first factor, concern for condemnation and felt rejection made up a second 
factor, and felt inferiority made a third factor, ∆ χ² (7) = 194.14, p < .001. Second, our model fit 
better than a four-factor model where the two appraisals were combined into a single factor while 
leaving felt shame, inferiority and rejection as separate factors: ∆ χ² (4) = 51.55, p < .001. Third, our 
model fit better than a three-factor model where items measuring the three feelings loaded on one 
omnibus emotional “shame” factor with the two appraisals as separate factors, ∆ χ² (7) = 272.81, p 
< .001. Fourth, our model fit better than a two-factor model where both appraisals loaded on a 
single “appraisals” factor and all three feelings loaded on one omnibus emotional “shame” factor:  
∆ χ² (9) = 318.83, p < .001. Fifth, our model proved superior to a model where all items loaded onto 
a single “shame” factor, ∆ χ² (10) = 422.06, p < .001. As well as these theoretically motivated 
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alternatives, we tested a series of four-factor models collapsing each possible pair of 
constructs into a single factor, while leaving the remaining three factors unchanged. In every case, 
our five-factor model provided a better fit (all ∆ χ² (4) ≥ 21.90, all p < .001). All told, our 
hypothesized measurement model proved superior to 14 simpler alternatives. 
The “ashamed” item. If felt rejection and felt inferiority were components of shame—rather 
than separate, but closely correlated feelings—then one would expect participants’ use of the word 
“ashamed” to be predicted by all three feelings: in other words, that the item “ashamed” would 
cross-load positively on the felt rejection and felt inferiority factors. Hence, we allowed the item 
that explicitly referred to “ashamed” to load on both the felt shame and felt rejection factors. This 
provided a minor improvement upon our hypothesized model, ∆ χ² (1) = 4.00, p = .046. However, 
the “ashamed” item loaded negatively, rather than positively on the felt rejection factor 
(standardized  = -.12, p = .051). In a second model, we allowed the “ashamed” item to load on 
both the felt shame and felt inferiority factors. This provided an improvement in fit, ∆ χ² (1) = 
16.03, p < .001, but the “ashamed” item loaded negatively on the felt inferiority factor (standardized 
 = -.44, p < .001). These models provide especially clear evidence for our view of felt rejection 
and inferiority as correlates of felt shame, rather than components of a unitary shame construct. 
Once the correlations among these three feelings were accounted for, participants’ use of the word 
“ashamed” was positively associated only with the other items in our felt shame factor. In fact, the 
more participants felt inferior or rejected, the less likely they were to describe themselves as feeling 
“ashamed”. 
“Rejected” items. Two alternative models confirmed that the two items that included the 
word “rejected” were uniquely associated with their hypothesized factors. A model allowing the 
concern for condemnation item, “I can be rejected by others because of what I have done”, to cross-
load on the felt rejection factor provided no significant improvement in model fit, ∆ χ² (1) = 1.40, p 
= .237. Indeed, the cross-loading was small (standardized  = .09) and non-significant (p = .223). 
Similarly, allowing the felt rejection item, “I feel rejected thinking about what happened”, to cross-
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load on the concern for condemnation factor provided no significant improvement in 
model fit, ∆ χ² (1) = 2.11, p = .146. The cross-loading was small (standardized = .09) and non-
significant (p = .140). Thus, our participants were able to distinguish between an appraisal of 
concern of being rejected from the subjective state of feeling “rejected”. This is important evidence 
of construct validity, and offers further support for our distinction between appraisals of and 
feelings about moral failure. 
Discussion 
As hypothesized, we showed that these two appraisals (of specific self-defect and concern 
for condemnation) and three feelings (of shame, rejection, and inferiority) were measured as distinct 
constructs. Our hypothesized measurement model proved superior to 14 different alternatives. 
Moreover, several fine-grained tests of the performance of individual items showed that these items 
behaved in accordance with our theoretical model 
Where fewer items are used to assess the appraisals and feelings relevant to the experience 
of moral failure, and measurement models are not specified and compared, it is likely that one will 
not adequately distinguish the related appraisals and feelings that are part of the experience of moral 
failure. This is why our construct validation was an important first step. By distinguishing 
appraisals and feelings about moral failure, we are better able to examine when moral failure leads 
to pro-social motivation and when it leads to self-defensive motivation. 
Study 1 
Study 1 was designed to examine experimentally when moral failure is experienced in a way 
that leads to self-defensive vs. pro-social motivation. Based in the predicted pathways shown in 
Figure 1, we aimed to show that experimentally establishing a risk to participants’ social-image 
would lead them to appraise a moral failure as raising a concern for condemnation by others. As 
such, manipulating risk to social-image should lead to greater motivation to avoid moral failure, via 
an appraisal of concern for condemnation  felt rejection mediation pathway. In other words, self-
defensive motivation regarding moral failure should be explained by efforts to protect one’s social-
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image from damage. In contrast, experimentally establishing a risk to participants’ social-
image should not affect participants’ appraisal of a specific defect. Thus, risk to social-image should 
not affect felt shame or the pro-social motivation that should be predicted by felt shame about a 
specific moral defect.  
Method 
Participants. Eighty-five participants (18 male, 67 female; Mage = 31.5, range: 19-65 years) 
from southern Norway participated in the study. Through kind permission from several managers, 
we were allowed to recruit participants in libraries and other public buildings, universities, and 
private companies. All participants volunteered and did not receive compensation. Four additional 
participants (1 in the moral failure condition and 3 in the moral failure with risk to social-image 
condition) are disregarded here, because they provided their demographics but did not respond to 
the rest of the questionnaire. 
Procedure and Design. Participants were asked to take part in a study on “social emotions.” 
They were randomized and tested in small groups ranging from 5 to 11 and were encouraged not to 
talk during the experiment. Each participant was handed 2 sealed envelopes. In the first envelope 
there was a short questionnaire encouraging participants to think about and then describe and write 
down a recent instance when they had mistreated a family member. When all participants had 
finished writing down their story and handed the first envelope back to the experimenter, they were 
told to open the second envelope. This contained the experimental manipulation3 on the cover-page, 
followed by a questionnaire that included the measures described below.  
In the moral failure condition (N = 44) the cover page for the materials in the second 
envelope read: “Thank you for completing the first part of the questionnaire. At the end of the 
session, a random selection of the stories will be read out as illustrative examples. However, your 
story is not one of those selected.” Thus, in this condition, participants relived a moral failure but 
they had no reason to think that their social-image was at risk because their moral failure remained 
private.  
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In the moral failure with risk to social-image condition (N = 41), the cover page 
for the materials in the second envelope read: “Thank you for completing the first part of the 
questionnaire. At the end of the session, a random selection of the stories will be read out as 
illustrative examples. Your story is one of those selected. However, please note that you will not be 
identified as the author of this story.” Thus, the manipulation lead participants to anticipate being 
scrutinized by the others in the room, who would naturally look at each individual for signs of 
culpability as their moral failure was read out. In this way, the manipulation clearly put participants’ 
social-image at risk.  
At the end of the study, participants were informed that their responses were completely 
anonymous and that no stories would be read out. They were very thoroughly debriefed and given 
the option to contact the experimenter for further conversation. Thus, great care was taken with the 
participants.  
Measures. Following the experimental manipulation, all participants answered a series of 
questions with response scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much), which included the 
following: 
In order to assure that participants perceived their moral failure as equally wrong across 
conditions, we used a four-item scale to measure the perceived severity of moral failure (α = .92): 
“What I did in that situation was wrong”, “My behavior in that situation was questionable”, “My 
actions in that situation were not good” and “What I did was bad”.  
Appraisal of specific self-defect (α = .53), appraisal of concern for condemnation (α = .82), 
felt shame (α = .92), felt inferiority (α = .68), and felt rejection (α = .93) were measured as 
described in the scale validation section. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of each measure 
along with their inter-correlations.  
Pro-social Motivation: Restitution (α = .77) was measured with two items: “I will try to 
repair some of the damage I have caused” and “I feel I should compensate my family member for 
what has happened”.  
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Self-defensive Motivation: Avoidance (α = .62) was measured with five items 
closely adapted from those used by Gausel et al., (2012) regarding an in-group moral failure. The 
five items referred to behavioral forms of avoidance (“If I could I would like to avoid meeting 
people who know what I did”, “I would rather not get mixed in discussions about what I did”, and 
“I would not mind talking about what I did” [reversed]) as well as psychological forms of avoidance 
(“If I met my family member I would think of something else than what I did”, and “I would like to 
forget about what I did and everything that happened”). 
Results 
Participants reported a variety of moral failures, including lying, stealing, and acting 
unfairly. On average, they judged their moral failures to be moderately wrong. Consistent with this, 
participants tended to report moderate felt shame. Importantly, participants judged their moral 
failure to be equally wrong in the moral failure (M = 4.95, SD = 1.89) and moral failure with risk to 
social-image (M = 4.62, SD = 1.63) conditions, F (1,83) = .78, p = .380, partial²  = .01. However, 
preliminary analyses revealed a marginal difference in the gender ratio across conditions, χ2 (1) = 
3.26, p = .071. Hence, we controlled for gender in all analyses. Degrees of freedom differ slightly 
across statistical tests owing to missing data. 
We asked three people in the same age group who were unaware of our hypotheses, to rate 
the stories using the same severity items that participants completed (α’s for each rater ranged from 
.94 to .97; inter-rater α = .71). Raters’ judgments of severity in the moral failure condition (M = 
4.80, SD = 1.49) and in the moral failure with risk to social-image condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.06) 
did not differ significantly from participants’ judgments. A 2(condition) x 2(perspective: participant 
versus rater) ANOVA showed non-significant effects of condition, F (1,83) = .04, p = .846, partial² 
< .01, perspective, F (1,83) = .79, p = .377, partial² = .01, and the condition x perspective 
interaction, F (1,83) = 3.06, p = .084, partial² = .04.  
Experimental Effects of Risk to Social-Image. Table 1 reports means in each condition. 
We predicted that the experimental manipulation would increase the appraisal of concern for 
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condemnation, feelings of rejection, and avoidance motivation. A MANCOVA on these 
three variables, controlling for gender, showed a significant multivariate effect, F (3, 78) = 4.08, p = 
.010, partial² = .14. Separate ANCOVAs on each measure confirmed that our manipulation of risk to 
social-image significantly increased appraisals of concern for condemnation, F (1,82) = 4.10, p = 
.046, partial² = .05, as well as avoidance motivation, F (1, 81) = 7.45, p = .008, partial² = .08. 
However, we found no significant effect on felt rejection, F (1, 80) = .07, p = .795, partial² < .01. 
Gender showed no significant effects. 
In contrast, we did not expect our manipulation of risk to social-image to affect the appraisal 
of specific defect, feelings of shame and inferiority, or restitution motivation. Consistent with this, a 
MANCOVA on these four variables, controlling for effects of gender, showed a non-significant 
multivariate effect, F (4, 77) = .76, p = .557, partial² = .04. None of the individual effects was 
statistically significant: Specific self-defect F (1,82) = .39, p = .536, partial² < .01; felt shame F 
(1,81) = 1.65, p = .202, partial² = .02; felt inferiority F (1, 80) = .09, p = .771, partial² < .01; 
restitution motivation, F (1,80) = 1.78, p = .186, partial² = .02. Again, gender showed no significant 
effects. Thus, neither the appraisal of specific self-defect nor the feeling of shame could account for 
the self-defensive motivation caused by our manipulation of risk to social-image.  
Mediation of Self-Defensive Motivation. Following the recommendations of MacKinnon, 
Fairchild, and Fritz (2007) and Shrout and Bolger (2002), we conducted a formal mediation analysis 
to examine our predictions regarding why a moral failure with risk to social-image causes 
avoidance motivation (see Figure 3). Using Mplus Version 6 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2010), we 
calculated bootstrapped estimates (10,000 resamples) of the standardized point estimates (SPE) and 
confidence intervals (CI) for the theoretically important direct and indirect paths within the model. 
We controlled for effects of gender on all three measured variables: Females were more avoidant 
than males (SPE = .156, p = .015, 95% CI: .030, .281), whereas gender differences in concern for 
condemnation and felt rejection were not significant 
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As shown in Figure 3, all theorized paths were statistically significant. 
Bootstrapped indirect effect estimates confirmed the presence of a significant indirect effect of our 
manipulation of risk to social-image through concern for condemnation on felt rejection, SPE = 
.140, p = .041, 95% CI: .006, .275, and a marginally significant indirect effect of our manipulation 
through concern for condemnation (and partially through felt rejection) on avoidance motivation, 
SPE = .104, p = .069, 95% CI: -.008, .216 (90% CI: .010, .198). In addition, the manipulation had a 
significant direct effect on avoidance motivation (SPE = .223, p = .012, 95% CI: .049, .396). Thus, 
concern for condemnation and felt rejection appeared to partially mediate the effect of risk to 
social-image on avoidance motivation.  
 Could Shame Appear Self-defensive? In contrast to the present finding that concern for 
condemnation and felt rejection explain why moral failure with risk to social-image causes self-
defensive motivation, prior research has often shown shame to be linked to such self-defensive 
motivation. Thus, we used hierarchical Multiple Regression to examine whether felt shame might 
appear to explain self-defensive motivations if felt rejection and felt inferiority were not accounted 
for. Results are summarized in Table 2. As shown in Step 2 of the analysis, felt shame appeared to 
predict avoidance motivation independent of gender and the manipulation of risk to social-image. 
Indeed, felt shame appeared to explain a significant amount of additional variance, ΔF (1, 79) = 
9.13, p = .003, ΔR2 = 9.2%. However, consistent with our mediation findings above, felt shame did 
not reduce the experimental effect on avoidance motivation and thus could not account for this 
effect.  
More importantly, the link between felt shame and avoidance motivation was shown to be 
more apparent than real in Step 3 of the analysis, which included as predictors felt rejection and felt 
inferiority and the appraisals of specific self-defect and concern for condemnation, ΔF (4, 75) = 
7.45, p < .001, ΔR2 = 22.7%. In Step 3, when all of the specific appraisals and feelings about moral 
failure were distinguished from felt shame, felt shame did not predict avoidance. Avoidance 
motivation was predicted significantly by felt rejection (β = .24, p = .044) and marginally by the 
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appraisal of concern for condemnation (β = .25, p = .066). This suggests that felt shame 
only appeared to predict avoidance motivation because it was correlated with the more directly 
relevant predictors, concern for condemnation and felt rejection. 4  
Discussion 
As expected, the appraisal of a specific self-defect, feeling of shame, and pro-social 
motivation were not affected by our manipulation of risk to social-image. Instead, a moral failure 
with risk to social-image led to the appraisal of concern for condemnation and motivation to avoid 
the moral failure. The appraisal of concern for condemnation  felt rejection pathway partially 
explained why this risk to social-image led to greater avoidance motivation.  
This study also showed that if felt shame was not distinguished from the appraisals of 
specific self-defect and concern for condemnation and feelings of rejection and inferiority, felt 
shame would have predicted avoidance motivation. However, once these related feelings and 
appraisals were distinguished empirically, the appraisal of concern for condemnation and associated 
feeling of rejection predicted the motivation to avoid moral failure, whereas felt shame did not. 
These results suggest that the oft-observed link between shame and avoidance motivation is more 
apparent than real. The avoidance that is routinely attributed to “shame” should be attributed more 
precisely to an appraisal of concern for condemnation and associated feelings of rejection that result 
from a moral failure that puts one’s social-image at risk.  
One limitation of Study 1 is that we held moral failure constant. To provide experimental 
evidence that it is a moral failure that leads to the appraisal of a specific self-defect and thus felt 
shame, we needed to manipulate moral failure. Thus, Study 2 used a vignette method to offer a 
fuller experimental design. Study 2 also built on Study 1 by expanding our measurement of pro-
social and self-defensive motivation: Using a somewhat larger sample, we were able to use a set of 
pro-social and self-defensive responses to define latent variables of underlying pro-social and self-
defensive motivations. Additionally, in Study 1, the hurt family member was very unlikely to have 
been among those to whom the misdeed might be exposed in our manipulation of risk to social 
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image. In Study 2, we extended our findings by testing whether the effects of risk to 
social image would generalize to a situation where the wronged person was explicitly among those 
who might find out about the misdeed. Finally, Study 1 was conducted in Norwegian, whereas a 
majority of the research on moral failure has been conducted in English. Thus, to ensure that our 
findings were not driven by some idiosyncrasy of Norwegian semantics, we conducted Study 2 in 
an English-speaking country with English-speaking participants. 
Study 2 
Rather than asking participants to recall an instance of moral failure, in Study 2 we asked 
participants to imagine themselves in a single scenario whose features we manipulated. By having 
participants imagine either almost or actually breaking a friend’s confidence by revealing their 
secret, we manipulated the presence of a moral failure. We manipulated the risk to social-image by 
altering the extent to which the breach of confidence was likely to become known by others. We 
chose this particular interpersonal breach because honesty and trustworthiness are key aspects of 
morality (e.g., Leach, Ellemers & Barreto, 2007; for a review, see Leach et al., 2014), and revealing 
secrets appeared to be a vivid and realistic example of a moral failure for the participants. Based on 
our conceptual model (see Figure 1), we expected moral failure to lead to an appraisal of a specific 
self-defect. This appraisal should predict the feeling of shame and thus the pro-social motivation of 
contrition and restitution. In contrast, we expected risk to social-image to lead to an appraisal of 
concern for condemnation. This appraisal should predict the feeling of rejection and thus the self-
defensive motivation to avoid and cover-up the moral failure. 
Method 
Participants. 112 university students (38 male, 74 female; Mage = 22.4, range: 18-44 years) 
from the south east of the United Kingdom volunteered to participate in a study on social emotions 
when approached in the campus library.  
Procedure and Design. The randomized participants were given a 54-word story and were 
asked to imagine themselves as the protagonist: “You know a secret about one of your best friends. 
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They just had to share it with you as it was torturing them. The information that they 
shared came as a total surprise to you and you could never have imagined what you just heard. You 
promised not to let anyone know as the secret was extremely personal.”  
In the near moral failure control condition (N = 37) the story went on to say that the 
participant almost told the secret to someone else, but managed to keep the secret in the end. In the 
clear moral failure condition (N = 37) the story went on to say that the participant told the secret to 
someone else, but that they were “100% sure” that this other person did not know their friend and 
did not know anyone that could know their friend. Moreover, participants were told that the person 
to whom they told the secret could not discern whose secret it was. Hence, it was clear that there 
was little chance that the participant’s moral failure posed any risk to their social-image. In the 
clear moral failure with risk to social-image condition (N = 38) the story went on to say that the 
participant told the secret to someone else and that they were “100% sure” this other person knew 
their friend and understood whose secret it was. Participants were also told that they were sure that 
the person to whom they told the secret knew other people connected with the teller of the secret. 
Thus, in this condition, it was likely that the participants’ moral failure would become known to 
their friend and to several others at least. As such, in this condition, participants’ moral failures 
posed a serious risk to their social-image in the eyes of important others, which we expected to lead 
to attempts at self-defensive avoidance and cover-up so that this risk could be minimized. 
Our original design also included a fourth condition where the moral failure occurred, but 
the presence or absence of a risk to social-image was ambiguous, because “You are unsure whether 
this other person understood who you were talking about and whether they know your friend” (N = 
37). However, we focus our analyses on the three conditions that provide the cleanest test of our 
predictions, providing unambiguous information about the absence of presence of a moral failure (1 
vs. 2,3) and of a risk to social image (1,2 vs. 3). 
All participants included in this study indicated that the keeping of the secret was a serious 
issue and correctly indicated whether anyone could find out if the protagonist did or did not tell the 
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secret. Nine potential further participants were excluded as they provided their 
demographics but withdrew from the study before being reaching the manipulation. Participants 
were presented with a series of questions, including those described below, accompanied by 
response scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). When completed, participants were 
thanked and debriefed.  
Measures. Appraisals of specific self-defect (α = .60) and concern for condemnation (α = 
.86), as well as feelings of shame (α = .88), inferiority (α = .82), and rejection (α = .86), were 
measured as in Study 1. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of each measure along with their 
inter-correlations.  
Pro-social motivation was measured using three indicators. Items based on our previous 
measure of desire for restitution were divided into two indicators, which we called desire to repair 
the damage (one item: “I would try to repair some of the damage I have caused my friend”) and 
desire to compensate the victim (two items, α = .65: “I would feel I should compensate my friend 
for what has happened” and “I feel I should compensate my friend (e.g. offer emotional support)”). 
The third indicator, desire to communicate contrition, was measured using three items (α = .91) 
adapted from Gausel et al. (2012): “If I could I would like to tell my friend how sorry I feel,” “It 
would be important that my friend knew that I felt bad about this,” and “I would like to express my 
concerns to my friend”. 
Self-defensive motivation was measured using three indicators. Behavioral avoidance was 
measured with two items (α = .43): “If I could I would like to avoid meeting my friend” and “I 
would rather not get mixed into discussions about what I did”. Psychological avoidance was 
measured with two items (α = .51): “If I met my friend, I would think of something else than what I 
did” and “I would like to forget about what I did and everything that happened”. Desire to cover up 
the misdeed was adapted from Gausel et al., (2012; see also Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, 
Deonna, & Teroni, 2014) and it assessed the motivation to direct attention away from one’s 
immorality. It was measured with two items (α = .55): “I think I would make it less clear to others 
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what has happened” and “I think I would be aware of the information I shared with 
others”.  
A CFA with separate pro-social and self-defensive latent factors showed acceptable model 
fit, χ² (8) = 20.198, p = .010, CFI = .955, SRMR = .086, and all six indicators loaded strongly on 
their respective factors (standardized ’s, .55 all p < .001), indicating that each latent variable was 
well defined by its indicators. For ANCOVA and regression analyses, we created composite scores 
by averaging the three indicators of each motivation. The pro-social motivation composite score 
showed excellent reliability (α = .89, based on the three indicators), and the self-defensive 
motivation composite score showed good reliability (α = .72, based on the three indicators). Hence, 
the low scale reliabilities of the individual motivation indicators are of little concern, because these 
measures were either used as indicators of latent variables in our mediation models, or they were 
combined into composite measures that had good reliability. Although our sample size was 
relatively small by conventional standards for modeling latent variables, Boomsma (1982) proposes 
that samples of 100 or more are sufficient for models with 3 or 4 indicators per factor. Here, we 
used three indicators for each latent variable, ensuring that each factor was just-identified locally. 
We encountered no problems in estimation. 
Results 
We found no significant gender difference across Study 2 conditions, χ2 (2) = 1.18, p = .554; 
however, analyses revealed significant gender differences on several measured variables (described 
below). Hence, both for consistency with our Study 1 analyses and to ensure that gender differences 
did not confound the correlational relationships among these measures, we controlled for gender in 
all analyses. Nonetheless, parallel analyses without controlling for gender yielded a substantively 
identical pattern of findings for all hypothesized effects and pathways. 
Experimental Effects of Risk to Social-Image. Means of all measures in the three 
experimental conditions are shown in Table 3. To test the predicted effects of risk to social-image 
on the appraisal of concern for condemnation, feelings of rejection, and self-defensive motivation, 
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we ran a MANCOVA on these variables, controlling for gender, with reverse-Helmert 
planned contrasts. The MANCOVA revealed a significant multivariate effect of condition, Pillai’s 
Trace = .266, F (6, 214) = 5.48, p < .001, partial² = .13, and no effect of gender, Pillai’s Trace = 
.030, F (3, 106) = 1.08, p = .360, partial² = .03.  
Tests of planned contrasts supported our predictions. Our focal contrast compared the moral 
failure with risk to social image condition against the two conditions without risk to social-image. 
This contrast proved significant for the appraisal of concern for condemnation (Contrast Estimate: 
CE = 1.44, SE = .28, p < .001), felt rejection (CE = 1.19, SE = .27, p < .001), and self-defensive 
motivation (CE = .46, SE = .23, p = .045). The means of all three variables were higher in the moral 
failure with risk to social-image condition than in the other two conditions (see Table 3). An 
orthogonal (non-focal) contrast tested differences between the two conditions without risk to social-
image. As expected, this contrast showed no significant effects on any of these three variables (all p 
≥ .137). Thus, supporting our experimental procedure, the target appraisal of concern for 
condemnation was increased significantly by our manipulation of risk to social-image, but was not 
significantly influenced by our manipulation of moral failure. 
Mediation Model Predicting Self-Defensive Motivation. We conducted a bootstrap 
mediation analysis using Mplus Version 6 to test our theorized mediation model (see Figure 4). We 
created two variables to represent the planned contrasts tested above: a focal contrast representing 
risk to social-image (coded -1, -1, 2) and a non-focal orthogonal contrast (coded -1, 1, 0). In this 
model, we controlled for effects of the non-focal contrast and gender.  
The model showed an excellent fit to the data: χ2 (10) = 9.364, p = .498, CFI = 1.000, 
SRMR = .033. As shown in Figure 4, all theorized paths were significant. No direct or indirect 
effects involving the orthogonal contrast or gender were significant (all p ≥ .180). Bootstrapped 
indirect effect estimates confirmed the presence of a significant indirect effect of our manipulation 
of risk to social-image through concern for condemnation on felt rejection, SPE = .153, p = .001, 
95% CI: .062, .244, and a significant indirect effect of our manipulation through concern for 
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condemnation (and partially through felt rejection) on avoidance motivation, SPE = .254, 
p < .001, 95% CI: .120, .389. Unlike in Study 1, we also found a direct effect of our manipulation 
on felt rejection. Nevertheless, the unpredicted risk to social-image  felt rejection  self-
defensive motivation path did not reach significance (SPE = .062, p = .157, 95% CI: -.024, .148). 
Together with the significant indirect paths, the non-significant direct effect of risk to social image 
on self-defensive motivation (SPE = -.111, p = .367, 95% CI: -.351, .130) suggested that the effect 
of risk to social-image on self-defensive motivation was largely—and perhaps fully—mediated by 
the appraisal of concern for condemnation and the feeling of rejection. 
Experimental Effects of Moral Failure. To test the predicted effects of moral failure on 
the appraisal of specific self-defect, felt shame, and pro-social motivation, we ran a MANCOVA on 
these variables, testing the effects of our three experimental conditions with Helmert planned 
contrasts, while controlling for gender. The MANCOVA revealed significant multivariate effects of 
condition, Pillai’s Trace = .322, F (6, 214) = 6.84, p < .001, partial² = .16, and gender, Pillai’s Trace 
= .088, F (3, 106) = 3.40, p = .021, partial² = .09. Female participants reported higher felt shame, F 
(1, 108) = 7.01, p = .009, partial² = .06, and pro-social motivation, F (1, 108) = 7.38, p = .008, 
partial² = .06, but there was no significant gender difference in the appraisal of individual defect, F 
(1, 108) = 1.81, p = .182, partial² = .02. 
Tests of planned contrasts supported our predictions. Our focal contrast compared the two 
conditions with clear moral failure against the near moral failure control condition. This contrast 
showed the predicted effects on appraisal of specific self-defect (Contrast Estimate [CE] = 1.51, SE 
= .26, p < .001), felt shame (CE = 1.34, SE = .30, p < .001), and pro-social motivation (CE = .77, 
SE = .24, p = .002). An orthogonal (non-focal) contrast tested differences between the two 
conditions involving clear moral failure. Unexpectedly, this contrast showed that felt shame (CE = 
.82, SE = .35, p = .020), and pro-social motivation (CE = .70, SE = .28, p = .013), were somewhat 
higher in the condition with risk to social-image (see Table 3). Crucially, however, there was no 
significant difference between these two conditions in the appraisal of specific self-defect (CE = 
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.42, SE = .30, p = .155). Thus, supporting the validity of our experimental procedure, the 
target appraisal of specific self-defect was increased significantly by our manipulation of moral 
failure, but not by our manipulation of risk to social-image. 
Mediation Model Predicting Pro-Social Motivation. We conducted a bootstrap mediation 
analysis using Mplus Version 6 to test our proposed mediation model (see Figure 5). We created 
two variables to represent the planned contrasts tested above: a focal contrast representing moral 
failure (coded -2, 1, 1) and a non-focal orthogonal contrast (coded 0, -1, 1). In addition, we 
controlled for effects of the non-focal orthogonal contrast and gender.  
The model showed an excellent fit to the data: χ2 (10) = 15.751, p = .107, CFI = .983, 
SRMR = .034. As shown in Figure 5, all theorized paths were significant. Bootstrapped indirect 
effect estimates confirmed the presence of a significant indirect effect of our manipulation of moral 
failure through specific self-defect on felt shame, SPE = .301, p < .001, 95% CI: .187, .416, and a 
significant indirect effect of our manipulation through specific self-defect (and felt shame) on pro-
social motivation, SPE = .126, p = .022, 95% CI: .018, .234.Together with these significant indirect 
paths, the non-significant direct effect of moral failure on pro-social motivation (SPE = .143, p = 
.110, 95% CI: -.032, .318) suggested that the effect of moral failure on pro-social motivation was 
largely mediated by the appraisal of specific self-defect and felt shame.  
The model also showed a significant effect of gender on felt shame (SPE = .155, p = .020, 
95% CI: .024, .286), resulting in a significant indirect path: gender  felt shame  pro-social 
motivation (SPE = .073, p = .025, 95% CI: .009, .137). Reflecting the MANCOVA results, the 
orthogonal contrast significantly predicted pro-social motivation (SPE = .168, p = .025, 95% CI: 
.022, .314) but only marginally predicted felt shame (SPE = .126, p = .071, 95% CI: -.011, .262). 
Could Shame Appear Self-defensive? As in Study 1, we conducted hierarchical Multiple 
Regression analyses to examine how felt shame can appear to be self-defensive when the other 
feelings and appraisals are not accounted for. Results are summarized in Table 4.  
Self-defensive motivation. After accounting for gender and the planned contrasts 
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representing our manipulation of risk to social image in Step 1, felt shame was a 
significant predictor of greater self-defensive motivation in Step 2, ΔF (1, 107) = 26.08, p < .001, 
ΔR2 = 18.9%. However, as we found in Study 1, including the other appraisals and feelings in Step 
3 eliminated the apparent self-defensiveness of felt shame. Thus, in Step 3, the increased self-
defensive motivation caused by the risk to participants’ social image was significantly predicted 
only by the appraisal of concern for condemnation (β = .31, p = .005), ΔF (4, 103) = 3.03, p = .021, 
ΔR2 = 8.1%. 
Pro-Social Motivation. After accounting for gender and the planned contrasts representing 
the manipulation of moral failure in Step 1, felt shame was a significant predictor of pro-social 
motivation in Step 2, ΔF (1, 107) = 19.75, p < .001, ΔR2 = 12.7%. Including the other appraisals 
and feelings in Step 3 provided no further improvement over Step 2, ΔF (4, 103) = .82, p = .518, 
ΔR2 = 2.1%. Crucially, when controlling for these related feelings and appraisals, felt shame 
remained a significant predictor of pro-social motivation—indeed, its effect size remained 
undiminished. Thus, felt shame was only pro-social in this study. Felt shame only appeared to be 
self-defensive as well when the appraisals and feelings tied to risk to social-image were not 
accounted for. 
Discussion 
Study 2 corroborated the findings of Study 1 in at least three important ways. First, as in 
Study 1, the pathway to self-defensive motivation was initiated by a moral failure with risk to 
social-image and was mediated by the appraisal of concern for condemnation and the feeling of 
rejection. Second, Study 2 corroborated the results of Study 1 using measures in English, rather than 
Norwegian, and using a different manipulation of risk to social-image—this  shows that the Study 1 
findings cannot be attributed either to semantic idiosyncrasies of Norwegian or to specific aspects 
of the experimental context in Study 1 (such as the presumed absence of the wronged person from 
the audience to which the misdeed might be exposed). Third, Study 2 provided further evidence that 
felt shame predicts pro-social responses to moral failure. When felt shame was not distinguished 
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from related appraisals of specific self-defect and concern for condemnation, and related 
feelings of rejection and inferiority, it predicted both pro-social and self-defensive motivation (see 
also Tangney et al., 2014). However, once the effects of felt shame were distinguished from these 
related appraisals and feelings, felt shame predicted pro-social motivation, whereas it was unrelated 
to self-defensive motivation.  
Study 2 also extended Study 1 in two ways. First, Study 2 used a vignette method to expand 
the experimental design of Study 1. By having participants imagine almost (or actually) revealing a 
friend’s secret, we were able to manipulate moral failure in a subtle and careful way. We 
manipulated risk to social-image by altering the extent to which this moral failure was likely to be 
known by others, this time including the wronged person. In this way, we were able to provide 
evidence that the appraisal of specific self-defect most thought to lead to felt shame follows a moral 
failure itself. In contrast, the appraisal of concern for condemnation that we expected to lead to felt 
rejection followed from the risk to social-image posed by a moral failure that could become known 
to others. Thus, Study 2 provided the first experimental evidence we know of that moral failure and 
risk to social-image cause distinct appraisals and feelings that explain when people will respond 
self-defensively and when they will respond pro-socially to moral failure. 
Second, Study 2 covered a broader range of possible responses to moral failure. In Study 1, 
we had represented pro-social and self-defensive responses respectively by just one outcome 
variable each: desire for restitution and avoidance. In Study 2, using a somewhat larger sample, we 
were able to operationalize these motivations as latent variables, each of which was measured using 
multiple indicators. This allowed us to better test—and support—our prediction that the appraisal of 
specific self-defect and associated feeling of shame should activate a general motivation to respond 
pro-socially, whereas the appraisal of concern for condemnation and associated feeling of rejection 
should activate a general motivation to respond self-defensively.  
Although Study 2 corroborated and extended Study 1, it is important to note the differences 
between them. Likely due to the vignette method used in Study 2, participants reported higher 
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levels of both appraisals as well as higher levels of felt rejection and inferiority, and the 
correlations among the appraisals and feelings were generally higher than were observed in Study 1. 
The higher levels of felt rejection and inferiority may account for their higher correlations with felt 
shame in Study 2 as compared to Study 1. However, these correlations remained moderate and they 
were not so large as to undermine the parameter estimation in our models.5 Thus, Study 2 provided 
important corroboration and extension of Study 1 using a complementary method. 
General Discussion 
Most theorists agree that moral failures are painful mainly because a failure is taken as a 
sign that the self suffers a serious defect. Likely because of the psychological pain of viewing 
oneself as suffering a defect, many theorists think of shame as motivating self-defense, such as 
wanting to disappear, cover-up, withdraw, and avoid (for reviews, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; M. 
Lewis, 1992; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2004). However, there is increasing 
evidence that shame about moral failures is associated with pro-social responses (for discussions, 
see Ferguson, 2005; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Scheff, 2000; Tracy & Robins, 2004).   
By deploying Gausel and Leach’s (2011) conceptual model of the experience of moral 
failure, we aimed to explain when and why people respond with self-defensive or with pro-social 
motivations. Distinguishing among the appraisals of specific self-defect and concern for 
condemnation and the feelings of shame, inferiority and rejection enabled us to make specific 
predictions about which situation  appraisal  feeling pathways should best predict pro-social 
and self-defensive responses to moral failure. Our first step was therefore to disentangle common 
appraisals and feelings that people report experiencing in relation to their moral failures. Using 
CFA, we demonstrated that the two appraisals (specific self-defect and concern for condemnation) 
and three feelings (felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority) in our model were empirically 
distinguishable. Our five-factor measurement model fit much better than numerous alternatives 
inspired by the literature on shame and moral failures. All in all, the CFA provided unequivocal 
support for the distinctions made between the two appraisals (specific self-defect and concern for 
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condemnation) and three feelings (felt shame, felt rejection, and felt inferiority) in our 
model. 
Moreover, in Studies 1 and 2, we showed that experimental manipulations of risk to social-
image increased participants’ appraisal of concern for condemnation by others. This appraisal 
predicted greater felt rejection. In Study 2, we showed that a manipulation of moral failure 
increased participants’ appraisal of specific self-defect and also felt shame. Hence, we were able to 
identify two core appraisals of moral failure and then manipulate them separately, resulting in 
selective increases in different feelings. These results support the appraisal approach to emotion that 
highlights the importance of understanding how people subjectively appraise a self-relevant event in 
order to understand how they feel about the event and themselves.  
Explaining Self-Defensive Responses to Moral Failure 
In both studies, a risk to one’s social-image significantly increased the appraisal of concern 
for condemnation, which in turn predicted felt rejection and self-defensive motivation. Thus, our 
findings contribute to the debate about the role of public exposure in determining people’s 
responses to moral failures. Somewhat supporting Smith et al. (2002), we demonstrated that the 
mere concern for condemnation ignites the path towards self-defensive responses. But the reader 
should note that our model focuses on concern for possible, future condemnation (before it has 
taken place, since neither misdeed was actually exposed). This social-psychological concern that 
one’s misdeed may be known to others is therefore different to what might be expected in a 
situation where the moral failure is already publicly known (e.g., Smith, et al., 2002; for a 
discussion, see Gausel, 2013). Moreover, in line with Tangney and colleagues (2007) we 
demonstrated that a concern for condemnation is not central to the feeling of shame. It is the risk to 
social-image  appraisal of concern for condemnation  felt rejection pathway that leads to self-
defensive responses, aiming to limit the possible damage caused by a possible future exposure of 
one’s failure. The present results are also consistent with research on social exclusion, showing that 
the painful feeling of rejection predicts a wide variety of maladaptive strategies aimed at the 
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reduction of pain (Gausel, 2014b; for reviews, see Gerber & Wheeler, 2009; Leary, 2007).  
Explaining Pro-social Responses to Moral Failure 
If the experience of felt shame is a “dysphoric experience of contrite self-criticism about a 
failure in a domain important to the self-concept” (Gausel & Leach, 2011, p. 475), it should 
motivate the individual to amend the moral failure and repair any damage done. However, we 
reasoned that this pro-social potential of shame should be most evident when felt shame is clearly 
separated from the self-defensive risk to social-image  appraisal of concern for condemnation  
felt rejection pathway. This was shown clearly in both studies. In Study 1, when felt shame was 
distinguished empirically from other related feelings and appraisals, felt shame significantly 
predicted a desire to offer restitution to family members hurt by participants’ immorality. The same 
pattern was found in Study 2 when pro-social motivation was measured more broadly to include 
contrition, compensation, and restitution. Indeed, Study 2 offered direct support for the 
hypothesized pro-social pathway of felt shame: appraised specific self-defect → felt shame → pro-
social motivation. 
Although these results contradict the view of shame as self-defensive in nature, they support 
a long-standing view of shame as an important basis of social regulation and self-improvement (see 
Ahmed et al., 2001; Ferguson, 2005; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Keltner & Harker, 1998). The present 
results add to recent findings that shame predicts constructive self-criticism (Berndsen & McGarty, 
2012; Gausel et al., 2012), the desire to self-reform (Gausel & Brown, 2012; Lickel et al., 2014; 
Tangney et al., 2014) and various pro-social motivations aimed at benefitting others (de Hooge et 
al., 2010; de Hooge et al., 2008; Gausel et al., 2012; Imhoff et al., 2012; Shepherd et al., 2013). As 
moral standards are highly important for self-evaluation (Gausel & Leach, 2011), it is not surprising 
that feeling ashamed about a specific self-defect motivates self-reform. In addition to other factors, 
a positive self-evaluation depends on addressing one’s defects in a way that improves one’s moral 
integrity (Ferguson et al., 2007; Gausel & Leach, 2011). 
Nonetheless, some might wonder if the pro-social motivation observed in our studies is 
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nothing but a self-serving motivation meant to repair one’s image in the eyes of others. 
For example, in research by de Hooge and colleagues (2008), competence-related shame led 
participants to behave more pro-socially towards an individual who knew of their failure, but not 
towards an unrelated individual; thus, participants were seemingly making a targeted effort to 
restore and protect their social-image in the eyes of those that knew of their failure. Although 
Gausel and Leach’s (2011) model allows that threat to social-image can lead to pro-sociality when 
social-image is reparable, Gausel et al. (2012) recently demonstrated that the link between felt 
shame and the motivation to act pro-socially towards victims of immorality could not be explained 
by a desire to repair one’s social-image in the eyes of others. In fact, they found that the more their 
participants were concerned with their social-image (and feelings of rejection), the less they were 
concerned with pro-sociality that could aid the victims. Pro-sociality that is unaffected by an 
underlying social-image motivation might be understood as pro-sociality without hypocrisy 
(Gausel, 2013; Berndsen & Gausel, 2015). Consistent with this, the pro-social motivations 
measured in our current studies were not predicted by social-image concerns. Instead, they were 
predicted by felt shame based in concerns for one’s moral self-image (i.e., what kind of person am I 
that could do this?). Hence, it would be difficult to explain the pro-social tendencies shown by our 
participants as a self-serving motivation meant to repair one’s social-image. The pro-sociality here 
seems to be based in a sincere desire to redress one’s failure and support the victim—regardless of 
whether others will condemn one or not. This argument reflects very recent findings by Berndsen 
and Gausel (2015) that shame-based pro-sociality is a matter of making a stand against immorality; 
something that is diametrically opposed to a hypocritical repair of one’s social-image. 
Consequences of Failing to Account for Specific Appraisals and Feelings 
Naturally, one might wonder what we would have found in these studies, had we followed a 
more traditional approach, measuring only felt shame and examining its relation to self-defensive 
and pro-social motivation. In both studies, when we did not account for all of the feelings and 
appraisals in our model, felt shame predicted greater self-defensive motivation and pro-social 
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motivation, thus reproducing some previous findings where shame is associated with both 
pro-social and self-defensive responses to failure within the same study (e.g., Frijda et al., 1989; 
Roseman et al., 1994; Schmader & Lickel, 2006; Tangney et al., 2014). However, once we used our 
model of appraisals and feelings about moral failure, we could distinguish the pathways to pro-
social and self-defensive motivation. Hence, by deploying the Gausel and Leach (2011) approach to 
moral failure, we managed to explain that the feeling of shame has genuine pro-social potential, 
once it is distinguished from the appraisal of concern of condemnation and feeling of rejection (see 
also Gausel, 2006). Studies that fail to distinguish felt shame from these related appraisals and 
feelings—as well as those that artificially confound these constructs using hybrid appraisal-feeling 
items (e.g., Allpress et al., 2014)—will likely find self-defensive effects of “shame”. Yet we have 
shown here that it is the risk to social-image  appraisal of concern for condemnation  felt 
rejection pathway, rather than “shame” itself that explains self-defensive motivation regarding 
moral failure. This adds to the emerging view that shame is an emotion with the potential to 
motivate pro-social responses that can mend failures (for discussions, see de Hooge, 2014; Gausel 
& Leach, 2011). 
Possible Limitations 
Two possible limitations of these studies should be mentioned. First, in Study 2, participants 
were asked to indicate how they would feel if they had committed a particular moral failure that 
might be exposed to others. Although telling a friend’s secret is a common example of moral 
failure, the vignette methodology asked participants to imagine events and their appraisals, feelings, 
and responses. This method allowed us to manipulate separately participants’ appraisals of specific 
self-defect and concern for condemnation. However, the vignette approach is perhaps not as 
ecologically valid as that used in Study 1. We believe that what was lost in ecological validity was 
balanced by the gains of a clear manipulation of a substantial moral failure with and without risk to 
participants’ social-image in the eyes of important others (i.e., their friends). A vignette was the 
most practical way to gauge the experience of such a substantial moral failure with risk to 
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participants’ social-image in the eyes of their friends. Moreover, research has shown that 
reading vignettes aimed at evoking shame, humiliation and anger (among other emotions) does 
indeed produce intense emotional experiences, as indicated by electrophysiological measures (Otten 
& Jonas, 2014), and that self-reported emotional reactions to vignettes converge closely with 
reactions to real stimuli (Robinson & Clore, 2001). Here, results of the vignette methodology in 
Study 2 were closely corroborated by the event recall methodology in Study 1, and the relatively 
high mean scores also speak to the validity of our scenario—that participants were able to identify 
with the central character and imagine themselves in this role.   
Having said this, it may be important to note that Study 1 and 2 are quite rare within the 
shame literature in that we achieved successful manipulations of the appraisals thought to underlie 
feelings of shame and rejection. Successful manipulations of shame-related appraisals and feelings 
appear to be quite difficult to achieve in the moral domain because people resist experimentally 
imposed moral failures and attendant appraisals and feelings (e.g., Gausel et al., 2012; for a 
discussion, see Leach, 2010). This is likely a result of experimental moral failures necessarily being 
less serious and self-relevant than the ones we focused on here. 
The second possible limitation of our studies is our focus on moral failures, as opposed to 
failures in other self-relevant domains. Past research has shown little difference between shame 
arising from morality- and competence-related failures (e.g., Smith et al., 2002; for a review, see 
Tangney & Dearing, 2002), but it may be important to examine both in future work with our model. 
We suspect that the feeling of inferiority may be a more important predictor of self-defensive 
responses in competence-related failure (for discussions, see Gilbert & Andrews, 1998; Leach & 
Spears, 2008). However, there is little reason to expect shame to be more self-defensive in 
competence-related failures, once shame is distinguished from inferiority. In fact, recent 
experiments by de Hooge et al. (2010) show that feelings of shame about poor achievement lead to 
increased effort and a desire to improve one’s performance and thereby one’s self-evaluation. Of 
course, shame should be most linked to self-improvement motivation when improvement is viewed 
Running head: SHAME, INFERIORITY AND REJECTION 
 
35 
as possible (Gausel & Leach, 2011). When improvement is viewed as unlikely, a more 
global and stable view of one’s moral defect and the attendant feeling of inferiority should displace 
shame as an explanation. 
Conclusion 
To understand what participants mean when they express felt shame, felt rejection, or felt 
inferiority, we must examine how these feelings are linked to the various appraisals that individuals 
can make of their moral or other failures. Methodologically speaking, we can be most confident of 
an emotion construct’s measurement when it is embedded in a psycho-semantic network that uses 
reported appraisals to validate reported feelings (e.g., Gausel et al., 2012; Leach & Spears, 2008; for 
discussions, see Leach, 2010; Gausel, 2014a; Gausel & Salthe, 2014). A non-situated 
conceptualization of shame that views it as necessarily tied to a feeling of global or stable inferiority 
is too broad to capture the important nuances in people’s subjective experiences. Equally, a non-
situated conceptualization of shame that views it as necessarily predictive of self-defensive 
responses is too inflexible to capture the situated motivational implications of emotion.  
In our view, the feeling of shame predicted pro-social responses in these studies precisely 
because of its situated meaning, involving the appraisal of a specific self-defect and the wish to 
repair that defect through contrite pro-social repair. So, too, were the self-defensive responses a 
consequence of the combined concern for condemnation and the feeling of rejection. If there had 
been any pro-social motivation in this moral failure with risk to social-image  appraisal of 
concern for condemnation  felt rejection path, then participants would probably have been more 
likely to want to appease others or to act pro-socially for the sake of preserving their social image 
(see Gausel, 2013; Gausel & Leach, 2011; Keltner & Harker, 1998). Only by situating the 
subjective appraisal of emotion may we use linguistic expression as an (admittedly imperfect) 
indication of the meaning that people give to their experience in the world. This highlights the 
importance of viewing shame -- and all emotion -- as a situated expression of meaning that is best 
understood in relation to cognate expressions like appraisals within a particular relational context 
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(see Lazarus, 1991; Leach, 2010). 
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1 Reliabilities were calculated using the pooled data with items centered around their mean 
within each sample, as described subsequently. 
2 Although the small sample sizes speak against a CFA, we tested our measurement model 
separately in the data from each study. In both samples, the model fit was acceptable (Study 1 χ² 
[55] = 130.42, p < .001, CFI = .901, SRMR = .086; Study 2 χ² [55] = 127.43, p < .001, CFI = .925, 
SRMR = .061) and all items loaded substantially (standardized ’s > .50) and significantly (p < 
.001) on their predicted factors. To confirm whether it was appropriate to pool the data across the 
two samples, we tested for metric invariance within our measurement model by comparing two 
multi-group models so that we could validly compare correlational patterns across samples (Chen, 
2008). A first model estimating factor loadings and intercepts freely within each sample showed 
acceptable fit, χ² (110) = 257.85, p < .001, CFI = .914, SRMR = .073. We then computed a second 
model, in which we constrained the factor loadings to be equal across the two samples. If the fit of 
the constrained model remains acceptable, it can be preferred to the unconstrained model because it 
is more parsimonious, and the hypothesis of invariance can be considered tenable (e.g., Little, Card, 
Slegers, & Ledford, 2007). The constrained model showed an acceptable fit to the data, χ² (118) = 
290.03, p < .001, CFI = .900, SRMR = .091, indicating that the assumption of metric invariance 
across the two samples was tenable. 
3 In our original study design, a further forty-three participants were assigned to a moral 
failure with damage to social-image condition. The instructions here were identical to those of the 
moral failure with risk to social-image condition, except that participants were told that their story 
had been selected to be read to the group and that they would be identified. Thus, social-image was 
clearly going to be damaged in this condition, rather than risked. This strong threat appeared to lead 
to reactance, whereby participants gave very low average ratings on all of our measures. Moreover, 
six participants (i.e. 14% of this condition) left the study before completing the substantive 
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measures. Given our uncertainty about the validity of participants’ responses, as well as the threat to 
internal validity posed by the high drop-out rate, we decided not to analyze the moral failure with 
damage to social-image control condition. Note that this condition does not relate directly to our 
theoretical predictions, which focus on how people respond to risks to their social image, rather 
than certain damage. 
4 Further analysis showed that felt shame was a unique predictor of the pro-social motivation 
to make restitution even when controlling for felt guilt. We conducted a hierarchical Multiple 
Regression analysis predicting restitution, rather than avoidance. To ensure that the pro-social 
effects of felt shame were not in fact attributable to guilt (cf. Tangney & Dearing, 2002), we 
additionally included a measure of felt guilt (α = .80: “I feel guilty because of this”, “I feel 
responsible because of this”, “I feel guilty when I think about what I did towards my family 
member”). In Step 1, we controlled for gender and risk to social-image. In Step 2, felt shame 
significantly predicted restitution (β = .47, p < .001) and explained a substantial amount of 
additional variance, ΔF (1, 78) = 22.09, p < .001, ΔR2 = 21.5%. In Step 3, felt guilt did not explain 
significant additional variance, ΔF (1, 77) = 1.83, p = .180, ΔR2 = 1.8%, and felt shame remained a 
significant predictor of restitution (β = .35, p = .009), whereas felt guilt was not (β = .18, p = .180). 
In Step 4, felt rejection, felt inferiority, and appraisals of individual defect and concern for 
condemnation did not explain significant additional variance, ΔF (4, 73) = 1.81, p = .135, ΔR2 = 
6.7%, whereas felt shame remained a significant predictor of restitution (β = .28, p = .044). 
5 We checked the multi-collinearity diagnostics in our regression analyses. None of the 
Variance Inflation Factors was above 5, and none of the tolerances was below .2 
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations across conditions, and zero-order correlations, 
Study 1. 
   Moral failure  
Moral failure with  
risk to social-image 
 Zero-order correlations 
 Variable  M SD  M SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
               
-
- 
1. Specific self-defect  3.22 1.51  3.35 1.57  -      
2. Concern for condemnation  1.57 .76  2.03 1.26  .52 -     
3. Felt shame   3.83 1.75  3.46 1.83  .33 .30 -    
4. Felt rejection  1.93 1.45  2.07 1.36  .37 .63 .25 -   
5. Felt inferiority  2.38 1.54  2.35 1.42  .32 .56 .49 .53 -  
6. Restitution Motivation  4.70 2.03  4.17 1.79  .08 .11 .48 .20 .40 - 
7. Avoidance Motivation  2.54 1.15  3.29 1.24  .31 .54 .26 .48 .43 .19 
               
 
Note. Listwise N =82. Scale range = 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
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Table 2. Summary of hierarchical regression models predicting avoidance, Study 1. 
 
Predictors Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 
 β p  β p  β p 
Control variable         
     Gender .13 .224  .16 .116  .18 .051 
Context (manipulated)         
     Risk to social-image .32 .004  .36 .001  .28 .004 
Feelings         
     Felt shame    .31 .003  .11 .297 
     Felt rejection       .24 .044 
     Felt inferiority       .12 .342 
Appraisals         
     Specific self-defect       -.01 .945 
     Concern for condemnation       .25 .066 
         
R2 10.8%  20.0%  42.8% 
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Table 3: Means and Standard Deviations across conditions, and zero-order correlations, Study 2. 
  Near moral failure  Clear moral failure  
Clear moral failure with  
risk to social-image 
 Zero-order correlations 
 Variable M SD  M SD  M SD  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
                        
1. Specific self-defect 3.19 1.26  4.47 1.33  4.86 1.22  -             
2. Concern for condemnation 3.65 1.77  3.96 1.26  5.19 1.12  .38 -            
3. Felt shame  2.97  1.47  3.94 1.52  4.68 1.59  .69 .60 -           
4. Felt rejection 2.28 1.12  2.82 1.37  3.73 1.57  .48 .47 .60 -          
5. Felt inferiority 2.51 1.40  2.97 1.68  3.55 1.74  .49 .44 .69 .76 -         
6. Repair 5.53 1.58  5.81 1.29  6.29 1.18  .18 .29 .33 .22 .14 -        
7. Compensate 4.69 1.44  5.15 1.32  5.99 1.07  .41 .41 .56 .36 .38 .74 -       
8. Contrition 5.09 1.82  5.74 1.39  6.32 1.05  .35 .42 .49 .32 .28 .70 .75 -      
9. Behavioral Avoidance 3.39 1.55  3.39 1.30  3.76 1.43  .30 .43 .37 .29 .39 .10 .18 .17 -     
10. Psychological Avoidance 3.82 1.67  3.88 1.40  4.20 1.50  .20 .36 .31 .29 .23 .02 .05 .10 .57 -    
11. Cover-up 4.46 1.43  4.34 1.33  5.07 1.28  .25 .35 .41 .38 .32 .39 .32 .36 .37 .42 -   
12. Pro-social motivation 5.10  1.47  5.57 1.20  6.20 0.96  .36 .42 .52 .33 .30 .90 .91 .91 .18 .06 .38 -  
13. Self-defensive motivation 3.89 1.31  3.87 1.05  4.34 1.07  .31 .47 .45 .40 .39 .20 .23 .26 .81 .83 .74 .25 - 
                       
 
Note. Listwise N =111. Scale range = 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
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Table 4. Summary of hierarchical regression models predicting pro-social and self-defensive motivation, Study 2. 
 
Predictors Outcome 
 Self-defensive motivation  Pro-social motivation 
 Step 1  Step 2  Step 3  Step 1  Step 2  Step 3 
 β p  β p  β p  β p  β P  β p 
Control variable                  
     Gender .03 .731  -.08 .376  -.08 .349  .24 .008  .15 .082  .16 .063 
Context (manipulated)                  
     Risk to social-image focal contrast (-1, -1, 2) .19 .045  .01 .897  -.10 .292          
     Orthogonal contrast (-1, 1, 0) -.01 .908  -.12 .165  -.13 .156          
     Moral failure focal contrast (-2, 1, 1)          .28 .002  .13 .148  .11 .273 
     Orthogonal contrast (0, -1, 1)          .22 .013  .14 .093  .10 .243 
Feelings                  
     Felt shame    .50 < .001  .19 .210     .41 < .001  .44 .004 
     Felt rejection       .15 .267        .08 .571 
     Felt inferiority       .03 .844        -.18 .210 
Appraisals                  
     Specific self-defect       .07 .591        -.03 .812 
     Concern for condemnation       .31 .005        .13 .233 
                  
R2 3.7%  22.6%  30.7%  18.4%  31.1%  33.2% 
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Figure 2. Confirmatory Factor Analysis of Measurement Model, Study 1 and 2 combined. All 





Figure 3. Standardized point estimates (with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals) for paths from structural equation model 
predicting avoidance, Study 1. Significant paths (p < .05) are shown with solid lines; non-significant paths are shown with dashed 
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Figure 4. Standardized point estimates (with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals) for paths from structural equation model 
predicting self-defensive motivation, Study 2. Significant paths (p < .05) are shown with solid lines; non-significant paths are shown 
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Figure 5. Standardized point estimates (with bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals) for paths from structural equation model 
predicting pro-social motivation, Study 2. Significant paths (p < .05) are shown with solid lines; non-significant paths are shown with 
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